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National Police Oversight Models
It is beyond dispute that the NYPD is one of the most effective crime fighting forces in the country. Since the early 1990's, the NYPD has led the way in innovative strategies. Despite a fluctuating force size, the department has utilized outstanding police deployment tactics, and confronted terrorism in an unprecedented manner. The results have been monumental. A 76.3 % decrease in murder over 20 years; 80.5% decrease in robbery; 56.2% decrease in rape; and in fact overall crime is down 79.9%
[NYPD]. By any measure, this is an overwhelming success. The NYPD is deservedly seen as one of the leaders in modern crime fighting--and New York City and all New Yorkers are beneficiaries. New York today is an unimaginably safe city.
 While this unprecedented run of multi-year successes is unparalleled, the last few years have also witnessed a rising concern over NYPD practices and continued allegations of
supervisory level misconduct. Allegations of an excessive stop and frisk policy, ticket-fixing, manipulation of crime reporting, multiple allegations of retaliation against police department whistleblowers, allegations of an unlawful detention policy and a repeated course of conduct demonstrating an unwillingness to comply with proper demands for data have once again brought into focus the question of sufficient, independent, oversight of the NYPD.
The NYPD is the largest police department in the country, dwarfing its nearest rivals in Chicago, Los Angeles and Philadelphia. Even if those forces were combined, the result would only be 29,107 officers compared to the NYPD's 34,817 officers
[UCR]. Yet in each of those cities the enabling act creating civilian oversight provides the elements required for a vigorous independent oversight mechanism. From Chicago's Independent Police Review Authority and Police Board, to Los Angeles' Board of Police Commissioners and Inspector General, to Philadelphia's Police Advisory Commission and Integrity and Accountability Office, each of these agencies has the elements allowing them to administer an independent oversight process, beyond the reach of the police force. Most importantly, each has either subpoena power or the right to demand access to information relevant to its tasks. This is a central function of any meaningful oversight mechanism.
The review that follows examines the different ways the top five next largest U.S. police departments conduct civilian oversight. Three core elements are found in each (with the exception of Houston): transparency; independence; and compulsory power to demand documents, data, access to personnel and other information.
New York, NY
Jurisdiction: New York City Police Department [NYPD]
- City Population: 8,336,002
[UCR]
- Total Officers: 34,817
[UCR]
- Total Civilian Employees: 15,251
[UCR]
- Starting Salary: $41,975 (base pay police academy) [NYPD]
- Oversight Agency:
1) Civilian Complaint Review Board [CCRB]
2) Commission to Combat Police Corruption [CCPC]
- Authority:
1) The Civilian Complaint Review Board's authority is limited to receiving complaints and investigating allegations of misconduct including excessive or unnecessary use of force, abuse of authority, and discourtesy or the use of offensive language. [CCRB]
- Compulsory Power: Yes.
- Authority:
2) The Commission to Combat Police Corruption monitors and evaluates all corruption control policies and procedures of the NYPD. CCPC also performs audits, studies, and analyses of anti-corruption related policies and procedures. [CCPC]
- Compulsory Power: No.
- Membership:
1) The Civilian Complaint Review Board is overseen by thirteen Board Members. The NYC Council nominates five members (one from each borough), the Police Commissioner nominates three members, and the Mayor selects five members and appoints the NYC Council and Police Commissioner's nominees. The Board selects an Executive Director who manages daily operations of the CCRB.
[CCRB].
2) The Commission to Combat Police Corruption is comprised of six members appointed by the Mayor. [CCPC].
Examples of oversight models of the top 5 next largest police departments:
Chicago, IL
Jurisdiction: Chicago Police Department [CPD]
- City Population: 2,833,649 [UCR]
- Total Officers: 12,515 [UCR]
- Total Civilian Employees: 803 [UCR]
- Starting Salary: Starting Salary: $43,104 (first year) [CPD]
- Oversight Agency:
1) Independent Police Review Authority [IPRA]
2) Police Board [CPB]
- Authority:
1) IPRA performs intake for all complaints of misconduct. It is responsible for investigating allegations involving excessive use of force, police involved shootings, deaths in custody, domestic violence, verbal bias-based abuse and coercion. Allegations of misconduct outside of these areas are referred to the Police Department's Internal Affairs Division for investigation. When, IPRA finds a complaint to be valid, it will make a recommendation to the Superintendent regarding disciplinary action against the officer. IPRA also makes recommendations to the Superintendent, the police board, and the chairman of the city council committee on police and fire regarding policy and operating procedure reforms. [IPRA]
2) The Police Board can adjudicate complaints in two instances 1) after the Superintendent of Police files charges against a member; or 2) if a suspended member of the police requests a review of his or her suspension. [CPB]
- Compulsory Power: IPRA has subpoena power.
- Membership:
1) IPRA is headed by a civilian Chief Administrator, who is appointed by the Mayor and subject to approval by the City Council.
2) The Police Board is made up of nine members who are private citizens appointed by the Mayor with the advice and consent of the City Council.
Los Angeles, CA
Jurisdiction: Los Angeles Police Department [LAPD]
-
City Population: 3,841,707 [UCR]
- Total Officers: 9,858 [UCR]
- Total Civilian Employees: 2,896 [UCR]
- Starting Salary: $46,583 (Police Office I) [LAPD]
- Oversight Agency:
1) Board of Police Commissioners [LAPDBPC]
2) Office of the Inspector General [OIGLAPD]
- Authority:
1) The Board of Police Commissioners sets policies for the LAPD and oversees the Chief of Police who manages the department. [LAPDBPC]
2) Part of the Board of Commissioners, the Office of the Inspector General has the authority to investigate any type of activity (without limitations) of the LAPD, unless the Board of Police Commissioners orders to stop the investigation. [OIGLAPD]
- Compulsory Power: The Office of the Inspector General has subpoena power and unrestricted access to all LAPD files.
- Membership:
1) The Board of Police Commissioners consists of five civilians appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council.
2) The Inspector General is selected by the Board of Police Commissioners through a competitive interview process and majority vote.
Philadelphia, PA
Jurisdiction: Philadelphia Police Department [PPD]
-
City Population: 1,558,378 [UCR]
- Total Officers: 6,734 [UCR]
- Total Civilian Employees: 798 [UCR]
- Starting Salary: $42,474 (police academy) [PPD]
- Oversight Agency:
1) Police Advisory Commission [PAC]
2) Integrity & Accountability Office [IAO]
- Authority:
1)The Police Advisory Commission receives complaints and conducts investigations into allegations involving excessive or unnecessary use of force, abuse of authority, and verbal abuse. The commission may also conduct studies of police department policies, procedures or practices. Findings and recommendations made by the commission are forwarded directly to the Mayor, the City Managing Director and the Police Commissioner for their review and appropriate action.
[PAC]
2) Integrity & Accountability Office monitors and audits policies and procedures related to corruption, misconduct, and excessive use of force. The IAO has the authority to initiate studies and audits and makes reform recommendations. [IAO]
- Compulsory Power: The Police Advisory Commission has subpoena power. The Integrity and Accountability Office has access to virtually all police documents and personnel.
- Membership:
1) The Police Advisory Commission consists of fifteen members and four alternate members. Eight members and two alternate members are appointed directly by the mayor and the other seven members and two alternate members are selected by the mayor from a list of 21 nominees selected by the City Council.
2) Integrity & Accountability Office - Not available.
Houston, TX
Jurisdiction: Houston Police Department [HPD]
- City Population: 2,280,859 [UCR]
- Total Officers: 5,351 [UCR]
- Total Civilian Employees: 1,703 [UCR]
- Starting Salary: $31,965 (Police Cadet) [HPD]
- Oversight Agency: Citizens Review Committee [CRC]
- Authority: Citizens Review Committee is part of the Houston's Police Internal Affairs Department. The Committee reviews internal investigations for thoroughness and accuracy, and to make sure discipline is properly administered.
CRC has authority to review cases involving excessive use of force, officer involved shootings, incidents involving death and serious injury, and any case the Chief of Police requests CRC to review. [CRC]
- Compulsory Power: No.
- Membership: The Committee consists of three panels of seven citizens selected by the Mayor.
Washington, DC
Jurisdiction: Metropolitan Police Department [MPDC]
- City Population: 601,723 [UCR]
- Total Officers: 3,945 [UCR]
- Total Civilian Employees: 532 [UCR]
- Starting Salary: $48,716 (Police Office for first 18 months) [MPDC]
- Oversight Agency: Police Complaints Board, Office of Police Complaints [OPC]
- Authority: The Police Complaints Board oversees the citizen complaint review process and policies related to reducing misconduct,. The Board makes recommendations to the Mayor, the Council, and the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department. The Board also monitors and evaluates the Department's handling of protests and demonstrations. [PCB]
The Office of Police Complaints receives complaints and has the authority to investigate allegations involving harassment, excessive or unnecessary use of force, verbal abuse, discriminatory treatment, retaliation for filing a complaint with OPC, and failure to wear or display identification or identify oneself when requested. [OPC]
- Compulsory Power: Subpoena Power
- Membership:
The Board is composed of five members, one of whom is a member of the MPD and the other four are unaffiliated with law enforcement. The members are appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council. The Board selects an attorney as the Executive Director of the Office of Police Complaints.
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NYPD Oversight Reform Timeline
1894: Lexow Committee — A legislative investigation headed by Senator Clarence Lexow was established to investigate corruption within the NYPD. One of the main subjects of the investigation was Alexander Williams, a NYPD inspector, assigned to the Tenderloin district. Claims that Williams had received money from gamblers and brothel keepers was supported by testimony from Max Schmittenberger, a Chief Inspector, who stated before the committee that he himself had collected regular payments and turned it over to Williams. [New York Times]
1912: Curran Committee — Allegations of police graft lead to the creation of the NYC Aldermanic Police Inquire, headed by Alderman Henry Curran. Their investigation reveals officers assisted in robberies and police employees with criminal records were allowed to resign quietly. The committee report calls for home rule and a new body to control gambling and vice. [R.R. Browker Co.]
1930: Seabury Investigation — a state commission headed by Judge Samuel Seabury exposed vice officers shaking down prostitutes, and police officers and politicians in the grip of organized crime. [Encylopedia.com; and New York Times]
1950s: A Brooklyn District Attorney's Office special inquiry uncovered a scandal involving a Brooklyn bookmaker named Harry Gross, who had enlisted officers as muscle for his $20-million-a-year operation. The inquiry led to the resignation of Mayor William O'Dwyer, his police commissioner, a police chief inspector, 300 additional employees, 22 indictments, and 10 convictions. [New York Times]
1953: Following calls for police oversight from a coalition of organizations, the Permanent Coordination Committee on Police and Minority Groups, the NYPD establishes the Civilian Complaint Review Board within the department. The Board is comprised of three deputy police commissioners responsible for investigating civilian complaints. [CCRB]
1955: Mayor Robert Wagner expanded the powers of the Civilian Complaint Review Board. [CCRB]
1960s: Mayor John Lindsay appoints former federal judge Lawrence E. Walsh to assess NYPD operations. Walsh recommends ways to modernize the department, and suggests the Civilian Complaint Review Board's membership should include civilian representatives. The Patrolman's Benevolent Association (PBA) opposed civilian involvement. Mayor Lindsay created a search committee to identify civilians to join the board. The committee identified four candidates, whom the Mayor appointed. But the PBA achieved a ballot measure barring civilians from participating in police oversight. [CCRB]
1968: A Manhattan District Attorney's Office investigation uncovered a pattern of police payoffs in which officers took bribes by gamblers for advanced warning of police raids. The investigation resulted in the indictment of 19 officers, and the dismissal of 10 others for refusing to sign waivers of immunity to testify before a grand jury. [New York Times]
1970: Knapp Commission — In response to widespread corruption allegations and a front page New York Times story featuring information provided by Detective Frank Serpico Mayor John Lindsay organized a five-member Commission to Investigate Alleged Police Corruption, chaired by Whitman Knapp. [New York Times]
1972: The Knapp Commission's findings cite systematic corruption throughout the force. The commission recommended creating a central internal affairs division, making supervisors and inspectors more accountable for their officers, and imposing preventive anti-corruption measures. The commission also proposed creating a special state prosecutor for the criminal justice system. [New York Times]
1972-3: Mayor Lindsay and Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy embraced the commission's report and instituted a comprehensive overhaul of the department, replacing 90 percent of the top officers in the department. Commissioner Murphy was credited with turning the police department around, improving morale among the officers, and regaining the public's trust in the police. [New York Times]
1986: The City Council passed legislation restructuring the Civilian Complaint Investigations Bureau. The new law allowed civilians work with non-uniformed police officers. The six civilians were to be recommended by the council for appointment by the Mayor, and six civilians were to be appointed by the Police Commissioner. [CCRB]
1988: Tompkins Square Park Riot — In an attempt to combat complaints of drug trafficking and disorderly conduct, the NYPD began to enforce an existing park curfew. The curfew enforcement resulted in a violent clash between the NYPD and protestors. The CCRB investigated the incident and released a report finding that "there is no evidence that any effort was made to limit the use of force...Force was used for its own sake." [CCRB]
1992: Mollen Commission — Following the arrests of six NYPD officers by the Suffolk County Police, Mayor David Dinkins appointed an independent Commission to Investigate Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department. Led by Judge Milton Mollen, the commission investigated allegations of officers selling drugs, beating suspects, and other misconduct. [New York Times]
July 1994: The Mollen Commission report recommended the creation of a permanent independent oversight body, and an overhaul of internal programs for preventing and detecting misconduct. [Mollen Commission Report]
1994: Mayor Giuliani and the City Council debated the issue of an independent monitoring body. Both agreed the body should be independent of the police department; but the Council favored granting the body investigative and subpoena power, while the Mayor opposed. [New York Times; and New York Times]
November 1994: The NYC Council approved the creation of a new agency, the Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board, granting strong investigative powers. The body would have five members: two appointed by the council, two by the Mayor and a chairman approved by both. [New York Times]
December 1994: Mayor Giuliani vetoes the Council's police oversight measure, arguing that the investigative powers of the body would interfere with existing anti-corruption measures by local DAs and NYPD Internal Affairs. Giuliani also argued that the measure was not legal because it gave the council the right to make appointments to a board which would oversee executive branch operations. He considered that a violation of the separation of municipal powers. [New York Times ; and New York Times]
January 1995: The NYC Council overrides Mayor Giuliani's veto. Subsequently, Mayor Giuliani initiates a judicial proceeding to declare the law invalid. [New York Times]
February 1995: Mayor Giuliani defies the City Council by using an executive order to create a new agency to monitor police corruption. The new agency, the Commission to Combat Police Corruption (CCPC), can subpoena witnesses only at the request of the city's Department of Investigation and would not be permanent—could be dissolved by future executive order. The panel was to reply primarily on investigations conducted by the NYPD and conduct investigations only under rare circumstances, and with the permission of the Mayor and the Commissioner of Investigations. [New York Times]
June 1995: A State Supreme Court justice ruled that the City Council had exceeded its authority in creating their version of the independent oversight body. The judge explained that the body held powers that were "executive in nature" and that this would "curtail the Mayor's executive prerogatives." The judge said the council would have to change the city charter if it wanted to gain the right to monitor the police. The council appealed this ruling. [New York Times]
January 1997: The First Department of the Supreme Court Appellate Division affirms the ruling the City Council's law is invalid. Later in 1997 the NY State Court of Appeals declined to grant the council leave to appeal the decision. [New York Times]
August 1997: Following the brutal beating of Abner Louima inside a NYPD precinct station, the U.S. Department of Justice begins an investigation regarding the NYPD's handling of police brutality cases. [New York Times]
September 1997: In the aftermath of the Abner Louima incident, Mayor Giuliani agrees to increase funding and staffing for the CCRB. [New York Times]
October 1997: The NYC Council reformulates the 1995 police oversight legislation, creating an independent monitoring body with subpoena powers. Members of the board would be appointed by the Mayor, but two members would be designated by the council and the chairman would be appointed in consultation with the council. Mayor Giuliani vetoes the bill, arguing again that it violated the city charter and interfered with his appointment powers. [New York Times; and New York Times]
November 1997: The City Council overrides the Mayor's veto. [New York Times]
March 1998: The Mayor again sues to invalidate the law. He is joined by District Attorney Robert Morgenthau. [New York Times]
August 1999: The CCRB is strengthened somewhat when the NYPD agrees to stop re-investigating complaints against officers whose conduct has been deemed improper by the board. [New York Times]
September 1999: A State Supreme Court judge rules against the Mayor and calls for the City Council's oversight body to be established. The Mayor appeals. [New York Times]
September 1999: A report released by the Public Advocate says that hundreds of substantiated police misconduct cases were dismissed by police officials without further investigation. [New York Times; and New York Times]
July 2000: Giuliani indicates he would be willing to allow federal oversight of the NYPD with respect to handling of police brutality cases (re: DOJ Aug. 1997 investigation.) However, the inquiry does not result in federal monitoring. [New York Times]
December 2000: a city report by the Department of Investigation finds serious mismanagement at the CCRB, resulting in the loss of information regarding 80 substantiated complaints of police abuse. [New York Times]
January 2001: Giuliani proposes giving the CCRB prosecution powers over the police department. Under the proposal, the disciplinary hearings would be conducted by administrative judges employed by the city's Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH). The proposal is fought by police unions, as well as the City Council and the NYCLU. [New York Times]
February 2001: The Appellate Division rules in favor of Mayor Giuliani's (re: March 1998 suit), agreeing that the council proposal "improperly curtailed the power of the mayor by requiring at least two members of the panel to be appointed with the Council's consent." [New York Times]
April 2001: The CCRB approves a plan to expand its powers to include prosecuting the cases that it investigates. [New York Times]
May 2001:Appellate ruling for Giuliani sustained by Court of Appeals (re: March '98 suit.) [New York Times]
June 2001: Police unions file suit to block expansion of CCRB power in disciplinary cases. [New York Times]
January 2003: Appellate court agrees with 2001 lower court ruling that CCRB can prosecute police discipline cases, but says all disciplinary hearings must be presided over by police. [New York Times]
2005: Allegations of downgrading crime complaints to keep crime statistics low are brought forth by presidents of both the Patrolmen's and Sergeants' Benevolent Associations. The Commission to Combat Police Corruption initiates an investigation, requesting documents from the NYPD, which Police Commissioner Kelly refuses to provide. Shortly after, the Chairman of the Commission to Combat Police Corruption resigns. The New York Times quotes the Chairman's reasoning for his resignation, ''Doing the job in the right way, in the absence of subpoena power, requires ongoing discussion with the Police Department about the commission's jurisdiction and access to information.'' [New York Times]
2007: The NYPD releases statistics revealing that the officers stopped over a half-million pedestrians during 2006. Nearly 90 percent of the persons stopped were minorities. These numbers brought forth concerns of racial profiling. The department hired the RAND Corporation to study the correlation between racial profiling and officer stop-question-and-frisk tactics. The report finds no evidence of racial profiling. Several civil liberties groups question the analysis. [RAND; and New York Times]
January 2007: Following the NYPD shooting death of civilian Sean Bell, Mayor Bloomberg announces increases in the budget for the CCRB. [New York Times]
2008: A Citizens Union report notes that, without being subpoenaed, the NYPD historically has been slow or outright opposed to providing requested documents and compelling officers to show up in cases involving allegations of police misconduct. [Citizens Union]
2009: CCRB uncovers a pattern of improper stops in and around NYC Housing Authority buildings. An investigation into the pattern revealed that officers were unaware that reasonable suspicion is required to lawfully stop someone in and around NYCHA buildings (as with other locations). CCRB recommended to the NYPD that officers be retrained. [CCRB]
February 2010: An academic survey of over 100 retired NYPD captains and high-ranking officers finds departmental pressure to produce crime reductions led police officials to manipulate crime statistics. [New York Times]
October 2010: Following recommendations by CCRB to the NYPD regarding officer patrols of NYC Housing Authority buildings, the Department revised its guidelines and retrained officers. [CCRB]
2010-11: Significant reductions in the CCRB budget have raised questions about the organization's ability to perform its work effectively. [New York Times]
January 2011: Crime Reporting Review Committee — Following numerous allegations of manipulation of crime statistics, Police Commissioner Kelly appoints a panel of three former federal prosecutors to review the department's CompStat system. [New York Times]
May 2011: The CCRB conducted its first trial as part of the Administrative Prosecution Unit, a pilot project in which the agency prosecutes substantiated CCRB cases in the NYPD's trial room. [CCRB]
October 2011: The indictments of NYPD officers alleged to be involved in ticket-fixing, gun trafficking and other forms of misconduct raise questions over the department's ability to police itself. [New York Times]
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